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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
NEIL DIXON,

Case No.
13649

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of second degree
robbery (R. 194-195). The charges were tried before a
jury with the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding
in the Third District Court for the State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Neil Dixon, was found guilty by a
jury (R. 194-195) of the crime of robbery on February
26, 1974; and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison
to serve an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years
as prescribed by law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Third District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning of December 8, 1973, shortly
after midnight (R. 60), Jack D. Patterson, a part-time
clerk at the Seven-Eleven Store located at 4657 West
5415 South, was robbed of approximately $20. The victim
described the robber as a black male with a sparce,
scraggly beard (R. 56-57); a nylon stocking over his face
(R. 56); and wearing a blue stocking cap (R. 56), green
field jacket (R. 56), and carrying a pearl handle .22
caliber revolver (R. 60). The assailant fled on foot behind
the store (R. 63).
Patterson immediately phoned the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office (R. 63) who in turn dispatched law enforcement personnel (R. 83-84). In light of the fact that
few black people reside in the area of the robbery (R.
86, 88-89, 108), patrol cars were sent to cover all principle
eastern and northern routes (R. 94). Within minutes
the appellant, a passenger in a motor vehicle (R. 100),
was identified by Officer David M. Keiley at a distance
of 25 feet with the assistance of his automobile lights
(R. 100) at the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood
Road (R. 100), as the suspect who committed the robbery. Officer Kelly called for additional police assistance
and stopped the suspect after determining that the passenger of the vehicle matched the description of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suspect in the armed robbery (R. 100). After stopping
the automobile the officer noticed that the stocking cap
(R. 102), pearl handled gun (R. 103, 112), and coat (R.
104) of the suspect matched the description of the assailant involved in the robbery and the appellant was subsequently arrested (R. 104). A search was made of the
car in which the appellant was riding after he was placed
under arrest (R. 112).
During interrogation, Sergeant Egan indicated that
the appellant claimed to have been visiting with his sister-in-law's mother (R. 142) although he was unable to
articulate the location of such residence (R. 171-172,
176). When questioned about the robbery the appellant
stated to Officer Smith that "it won't do me a damned
bit of good to tell you because you are going to throw
my goddamned ass in jail anyway" (R. 128).
A short time after the robbery, the victim positively
identified the pearl handled revolver at the scene of the
arrest (R. 72).
The victim was photographed and booked on the day
of the robbery (R. 165-66). The appellant admitted
that the photograph was a reasonable facsimile of the
way he looked on the night of his arrest (R. 167) and
that there was nothing misleading with regord to the
picture that was taken (R. 167). Thereafter, the victim
was presented with a group of ten photographs on December 11, 1973, from which he identified the appellant
as the individual who committed the robbery (R. 59,119).
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Gary Scott, was the other party who was driving
the vehicle at the time the appellant was arrested (R.
161). The appellant admits that he has not seen Mr.
Scott since shortly after his release from jail in January,
1973 (R. 162) and that he is uncertain of his address
(R. 161) although knows that he is in Ogden (R. 162).
The record indicates that the appellant has made attempts to locate Mr. Scott although there is no statement which would indicate what methods or efforts were
employed to find hi swhereabout (R. 161, 162). The
respondent also unsuccessfully subpoenaed Mr. Scott but
admitted that his means were inadequate as the subpoena was merely mailed (R. 186).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
OFFICERS KELLY AND SMITH LAWFULLY STOPPED THE VEHICLE IN WHICH
APPELLANT WAS RIDING AND SUBSEQUENTLY MADE A PROPER ARREST AND
SEIZURE; AND, THEREFORE, THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREBY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The appellant has attacked the lower court judgment
on the basis that he was convicted by the use of evidence
which was obtained by an illegal search of the car in
which he was riding shortly after the crime was committed. Appellant supports this argument by stating
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that there was no probable cause for arrest and further
cites Gatlin v. United States, 326 F. 2d 266 (D. C. Cir.
1963), as authority for his position. However, it is obvious
that the racial and cultural makeup of the District of
ol Columbia which played an important part in the
Gatlin case is easily distinguishable from the community
in which the robbery in question was committed. Additionally, there is controlling Utah case law on this point
without resorting to federal districts or circuits outside
our own.
Since Officers Kelly and Smith did not observe or
have reason to believe that the automobile in question
had been involved in a traffic violation, the appellant
insists that the officer was required to have "probable
cause" to believe that the occupants of the automobile
committed a felony before he could lawfully stop the
vehicle. We disagree.
The standard of probable cause is generally associated with arrests, and the law draws a distinction between arresting a person, and merely stopping or detaining him. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1953), defines
an arrest as:
". . . the taking of a person into custody
in a case and in the manner authorized by
law. . . . "
This Court listed what it considers to be the basic elements of an "arrest" in State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah
360, 10 P. 2d 1073 (1932):
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Notice of arrest should be given, either
expressly or by implication, and without such
notice, no amount of physical restraint can constitute an arrest (cite omitted). The act relied upon as constituting an arrest must have
been performed with the intent to effect an
arrest and must have been so understood by the
person sought to be arrested. A forcible seizure of one's person, without any pretense of
taking him into legal custody, does not amount
to an arrest." Id. at 366.
See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-9 (1953). Clearly,
the mere stopping of a person during the course of a
polioe officer's investigation does not fulfill the above
requirements, and amounts to something short of an
arrest. Stopping a person is not the "taking of a person
into custody," but rather a means of conducting an investigation which may lead to a subsequent arrest. At
the most, a police stop can be considered the first stage
of a temporary detention of an individual.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of
Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), made it clear
that probable cause is not required before an officer may
stop a person suspected of having committed a crime:
" I t does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when
he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a
belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest." Id. at 26.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court further stated:
" . . . a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest."
Id. at 22.
Numerous state court decisions have held that police
steps and detentions need not be ftninded on probable
cause. In State v. Clomcm, 254 Or. 1, 456 P. 2d 67 (1969),
the Oregon Supreme Court held that an officer's stopping
of an automobile to determine the identity of the occupant and the vehicle was not an arrest, and could be
made without probable cause. In State v. Gunter, 100
Ariz. 356, 414 P. 2d 734 (1966), the police had been
informed that a driver of a certain automobile had discharged a shotgun at a gas station. The police stopped
the automobile a short time later to investigate, and
subsequently arrested the defendant. The defendant contested the right of the police to stop this car, and the
Supreme Court of Arizona held:
"Circumstances short of probable cause
to make an arrest may still justify an investigation. Should the investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the officer may
make an arrest and conduct a reasonable search
incidental thereto." Id. at 738.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
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consistently held that probable cause is not required to
stop automobiles. In United States v. Sadler, 458 F. 2d
906 (10th Cir. 1972), a highway patrolman stopped a
car for a routine driver's license and registration check.
As a result of investigation of facts learned as a result
of the stop, the patrolman found that the vehicle had
been reported stolen and arrested the occupant of the
car. The New Mexico patrolman testified that he made
the initial stop on the basis of the Colorado dealer plates
which were displayed on the car and the visible damage
to the trunk lid as though it had been pried open. The
Court held:
(1) "Detention for a routine automobile
registration check is not, per se, illegal," 458
F.2d at 908, and
(2) "Additionally, the patrolman's testimony indicated there was some basis for suspicion which would justify stopping the automobile." Id.
In United States v. Saldana, 453 F. 2d 352 (10th
Oir. 1972), a case involving the transportation of aliens,
the defendant was stopped because he had persons of
"Mexican descent" with him. In United States v. Fallon,
457 F. 2d 15 (10th Cir. 1971), the defendants were stopped
because they were "conspicuous." In Welch v. United
States, 361 F. 2d 244 (10th Ciri 1966), the defendant
was stopped because he was driving very slowly and
had his head leaning to one side. In all of the above
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cases, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers had a
reasonable basis for stopping the defendant.
The "reasonableness" standard was discussed in the
recent United States Supreme Court decision of Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). In that case, an
officer had received a tip from a reliable informer that
an individual in a car parked nearby was carrying narcotics and a gun at his waist. The officer approached
the car to investigate and asked the occupant to open
the door. The occupant rolled down the car window
whereupon the officer reached into the car and removed
a loaded revolver from the suspect's waistband. The
individual was arrested and the car was searched. The
defendant challenged the validity of his detention and
arrest and the admissibility of the evidence seized. After
reiterating the views previously announced in Terry, the
Court discussed the "reasonableness" standard for stops
as follows:
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information, may be most reasonable in
light of the facts known to the officer at the
time" (Emphasis added.)
The Court in Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923
(C. A. Cal. 1966), cert, denied, 388 U. S. 922 (1967),
stated the reasonableness standards as follows:
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"There is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under
circumstances not justifying an arrest, for
purposes of limited inquiry in the course of
routine police investigations; and . . . the test
of the validity of such a brief detention is
whether from the totality of the circumstances
it appears that the detention was based upon
reasonable grounds and was not arbitrary or
harrassing" Id. at 298 (Emphasis added.)
A series of California decisions have also stressed that
reasonableness may be established upon a showing that
the stop and detention are not "arbitrary or harassing."
See Wade v. United States, 457 F. 2d 335 (C. A. Cal.
1972); United States v. Zubia-Sanehez, 448 F. 2d 1232
(C. A. Cal. 1971); and United States v. Brown, 436 F.
2d 702 (C. A. Cal. 1970).
The facts clearly indicate that a man (later idenitified as the appellant) robbed the victim while employed
by the previously mentioned Seven-Eleven store. The
victim phoned in a description to the police and within
minutes, the sheriff's office located the appellant who
fit the description of the dispatcher broadcast (R. 99100). The automobile in which the appellant was riding
was stopped by law enfrocement personnel and further
evidence including a stocking cap, revolver and green
coat was discovered (R. 104). On the basis of these
observation the sheriff's office placed the appellant
under arrest and impounded the blue stocking cap
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(State's Exhibit No. 2), and a green jacket (State's Exhibit No. 3), as evidence.
The previously mentioned observations clearly indicated that Officer Kelly was justified in stopping the
vehicle and Officer Smith was justified in arresting the
appellant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (1953), empowers a
peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant as
follows:
" . . . (3) When he has reasonable cause
for believing the person to have committed a
public offense, although not in his presence,
and there is reasonable cause for believing that
such person before a warrant can be obtained
and served may: (a) . . . conceal himself to
avoid arrest, or (b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense."
See also State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P. 2d 798
(1961).
Moreover, the rule is well-established that upon making such a lawful arrest a police officer may seize any
evidence for which there is a reasonable basis to believe
is connected with the suspect or under his control and
would be probative of this or other crime. See Chimel
v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 89 S .Ot. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d
685 (1969), and Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234,
88 S. Ot 992, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1967).
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 269, 508 P. 2d 534 (1973),
is a recent Utah State Supreme Court decision who
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closely parallels the factual situation of the present controversy. The Court rejected appellant's argument that
the police did not have probable cause to stop, arrest
and search the appellant as follows:
"When a serious crime has been committed, the law-abiding citizenry should be willing
to put up with a moderate amount of inconvenience to cooperate with officers attempting to
capture suspects. In some situations it is necessary and therefore justifiable to resort to
measures which otherwise might be considered
improper intrusions, such as setting up road
blocks and checking cars or conveyances in the
area. In such exigencies it is essential that a
reasonable degree of tolerance be indulged as
to the judgment of police officers, so long as
they are acting in good faith and within standards of decent and decorous behavior." 508
P.2d at 536.
After certain crimes are committed, it has become
established policy for the police to cordon off a given
area surrounding the scene of the crime and set up roadblocks to stop all traffic in and out of the area. Such
police practices have been held reasonable to facilitate
their investigation of the crime. Similarly, officers patrolling the vicinity of a recently committed crime should
also be permitted to stop vehicles observed in the area.
In United States ex reL Farrugian v. Bhono, 256 F.
Supp. 391 (D. C. N. Y. 1966), the court held the following:
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"Under New York law, an officer who
had been summoned to the scene of a reported
crime and saw an automobile parked nearby
had the clear right to require the occupant behind the wheel to produce his license and registration."
Few would doubt an officer's authority to stop a
person seen walking on a street, late at night, in a direction away from the scene of a crime which had been
recently reported. However, when such person happens
to be riding in an automobile, it becomes impossible for
an investigating officer to speak with them or identify
them without asserting authority to stop the car. Thus,
it should not seem unreasonable to permit police to stop
motor vehicles and inspect driver's licenses as was done
by Officer Kelly. This merely places the motorist found
in the vicinity in the same position as the pedestrian.
The Court in Torres, supra, held that the stopping
under exigent circumstances did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure as defined in Utah Const.,
Art. I, § 14, and United States Const. Amendment IV.
The next question is whether Officer Kelly's decision to stop the vehicle occupied by appellant for investigative purpose was "reasonable" under the "totality of the circumstances." Respondent submits that it
was.
The Court in Torres spelled out the test of reasonableness which should be applied on the question as to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whether there has been a violation of one's constitutional
rights as follows:
-S
"[T]hat is, whether fair minded persons,
knowing the facts, and taking into consideration not only the rights of the individuals involved in the inquiry or search, but also the
broader interests of the public to be protected
from crime and criminals, would regard the
conduct of the officers as being unreasonable."
508 P . 2d at 536.
See also Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623,
10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1962), and State v. Richards, 26 Utah
2d 318, 489 P. 2d 442 (1971).
From the review of the aforementioned facts, respondent submits that the conduct of Officers Kelly and
Smith was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.
Respondent further contends that it is in the public
interest that police officers be informed of criminal activity in the community, and it is essential for police
officers to contact citizens in order to become so informed. Such contact, in the absence of coercion, does
not constitute a significant infringement on individual
liberty, and the law-abiding citizen should have a desire,
if not a duty, to cooperate with the police in protecting
his community, and should not be annoyed by reasonable stops made by the police. Respondent therefore
concludes that Officers Kelly and Smith lawfully stopped
the vehicle occupied by appellant ,and that after the stop,
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they obtained sufficient probable cause to arrest appellant and seize the evidence located in the car. Thus, the
evidence seized was properly admitted by the trial court.
The final pertinent consideration is that it is primarily the responsibility of the trial court to determine
the question of reasonableness and to rule upon the admissibility of evidence. Such judicial rulings are presumed to be correct and should not be disturbed unless
it clearly appears that there was error. See State v.
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968).
Applying the above principles to the facts of this
case, we see nothing which would justify overtiuiiing
the conviction.
POINT II.
APPELLANT WAS IN NO WAY PREJUDICED AT TRIAL BY THE ADMISSION
OF HIS PHOTOGRAPH INTO EVIDENCE.
A brief review of appellant's photograph (State Exhibit No. 8) which was admitted into evidence indicates
that there was no prejudice nor inflammatory value derived therefrom. Hence, appellant's contention which
isnot suported by any statutory or case law authority
appears to be without merit.
The admission of photographs into evidence is properly within the sound discretion of the trial court and
the reviewing court should only interfere when manifest
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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error is shown. In State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443
P. 2d 392 (1968), this Court held as follows:
". . . I t is a matter of discretion with the
trial judge to determine whether the probative
value of the picture outweighs the possible adverse effect which might be produced upon being shown to a jury. (Citation omitted.) This
discretion on the part of a trial judge to admit
or reject evidence should not be interferred
with by an appellate court unless manifest
error is shown." 443 P . 2d at 399.
The state was duty-bound to prove the identity of
the assailant and all elements of the crime by whatever
evidence was available. This includes photographs. The
victim identified the appellant as the individual who committed the robbery from a selection of ten photographs
(R. 119-120). The appellant admitted that the photograph was a reasonable facsimile of the way he looked
on the night that he was arrested and that there was
nothing misleading about the picture (R. 167).
The question as to the propriety of admitting such
photographic evidence is largely within the discretion
of the trial court. See State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46,
475 P. 2d 543 (1970). The admission of the photograph
of the appellant and the fact that the victim was able
to identify the appellant as the individual who committed
the robbery, gave probative value to the other testimony
and evidence presented at trial. No inflammatory or
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gruesome nature attended the photograph as confirmed
by the appellant's own admission (R. 167).
Respondent submits that inasmuch as it does not
appear that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling
upon the admissibility of the photograph that the ruling
should not be disturbed.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUSTAINING
THE STATE'S OBJECTION BASED UPON
AN EXPRESSION OF LEGAL OPINION.
Appellant contends that the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson prejudiced the jury by sustaining the State's
objection to closin gremarks made by counsel for the
appellant.
Utah case law on this point is well established. State
v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P. 2d 173 (1943), holds
as follows:
" . . . Both the court and prosecutors should
be zealous in protecting the rights of an accused, and should carefully refrain from doing
or saying anything which it might be inferred
that an unfair advantage was taken of a defendant." 134 P . 2d at 176.
The trial court record indicates that Judge Jeppson
seriously adhered to the aforementioned rule (R. 33).
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At no time did he comment on the weakness or strength
of appellant's evidence.
In Utah, trial judges are not moderators or referees,
however they can express themselves on all questions
of law that arise in trial regardless of whether or not
there is an objection. A judge may assign his reason floor
the ruling and where such reasoning is based on an expression of a legal opinion or proposition of law, no rereversible error is committed. See State v. Kallas, 97
Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414 (1939).
The remarks of Judge Jeppson, that appellant has
called into question, were the result of a ruling that he
made pursuant to the State's objection. The Court sustained the objection and said that appellant's statement
was unwarranted under the circumstances (R. 33). The
statement of the trial court was an accurate statement
of the law. (Respondent's Brief, page .....) Further, the
judge's remarks were not addressed to the jury. The
remark had nothing to do with the character of the defendant or the strength of his case as far as the trial
judge was concerned. Thus, it is clear that the ruling
byJudge Jepson was not a comment upon the weight of
the evidence.
This Court in State v. Kallas, supra, defines the
parameter of a trial court judge as follows :
" . . . In Utah trial judges are not moderators or referees and may express themselves
on all questions of law in trial whether arising
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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upon exception or otherwise. And they . . .
may within reasonable limitations assign their
reasons for their rulings; and where their reasoning is based upon an expression of legal
opinion, or a proposition of law no reversible
error is committed." 94 P. 2d at 426.
The case before this Court is unlike State v. Rosenbaum, 22 Utah 2d 159, 449 P. 2d 999 (1969), in that at
no time did Judge Jeppson direct his remarks to the
jury. It was bench's judicial duty to rule on the objection and articulate the basis of its legal opinion. On the
other hand, the trial judge in Rosenbaum wrongfully gave
specific cautionary instructions directly to the jury regarding the defense of alibi.
From the foregoing facts it is evidence that Judge
Jeppson was merely performing his judicial functions
as they related to the resolution of an objection. His
statements to counsel were correct and supported the
trial count record. At no time did he make prejudicial
oammenst to the jury regarding weight to be given to
appellant's evidence. Therefore, appellant's argument is
simply without merit.
CONCLUSION
The physical evidence introduced by the State was
the product of a lawful stop, arrest, and search which
fully protected appellant's oonstitutional rights. Therefore, the trial court was correct in admitting the evidence
obtained.
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Appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of
his own photograph nor the court's statement during his
closing argument. Such actions are clearly within the
trial court's discretion.
Therefore, respondent asks that the judgment of the
Third District Court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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